Its In A Sentence

Q: How to use its in a sentence?

1. Why then should we not also prefer its existence? 2. This is natural necessity, in one of its branches. 3. No necessitated act of the mind can be its virtue or its vice. 4. We can turn it in no light without being struck with its inconsistencies or its futility. 5. I scarcely know which amazes me the more, its littleness or its grandeur.

Short & Simple Example Sentence For Its | Its Sentence

Why then should we not also prefer its existence?
This is natural necessity, in one of its branches.
No necessitated act of the mind can be its virtue or its vice.
I scarcely know which amazes me the more, its littleness or its grandeur.
We admit, then, that the essence of a virtuous act lies in its nature.

How To Use Its In A Sentence?

We can turn it in no light without being struck with its inconsistencies or its futility.
This acts directly upon the will itself, and absolutely controls all its movements.
This is the cause of volition, and it is impossible for the effect to be loose from its cause.
I rejoice in the glory of its triumphs, and am ready to pronounce its empire boundless.
How can it be free and independent in its acts, and yet under the dominion of efficient causes?
Let us look at it a little more closely, and examine the nature and mechanism of its parts.
We shall merely remark in passing, that it owes its existence to a false method of philosophizing.
It is as if a needle touched with the loadstone were sensible of and pleased with its turning toward the north.
It reaches not to the interior sphere of the will itself, and has no more to do with its freedom than has the influence of the stars.
If we raise our eyes to such a source of virtue, its intrinsic lustre and beauty seem to fade from our view.
Now we see this scheme as it is in itself, in all its nakedness, just as it is presented to us by its own most able and enlightened defenders.
It does not bear upon its face the mark of any such subjection "to the power and action" of a cause.
He must find the freedom of the soul then, if he find it at all, in one of its passive susceptibilities.
He will allow no more sin to make its appearance in the world, say they, than he will cause to redound to the good of the universe.
The will may be absolutely necessitated in all its acts, and yet the body may be free from external co-action or natural necessity!
That is to say, he undertook to criticise and find fault with the great volume of nature, before he had even learned its alphabet.
But the stream of knowledge, ever deepening and widening in its course, has been gradually undermining the foundations of this dark system.
It is an admission which, in our opinion, will show the scheme of necessity to be insecure in its foundation, and disjointed in all its parts.
He there says, that the virtuousness of every virtuous act or choice depends upon its own nature, and not upon its origin or cause.
It is useful, says he, in its tendency to subdue human arrogance; it represses the wisdom and cunning of human reason.
Appeal to the universal reason of man, and the same emphatic No, will come up from its profoundest depths.
Even Edwards ridicules the idea of the faculty or power of will, or the soul in the use of that power determining its own volitions.
It does not deny the possibility of liberty; for it recognises its actual existence in the Divine Being.
Before I have time to do so, the power and the light which is thus shut out from the world by so pitiful a cause, is revealed in all its glory.
According to his philosophy, it can have no existence; and hence we are not to look into that philosophy for any very clear account of how it took its rise in the world.
Nothing can be more chimerical, it seems to us, than this distinction between being the author of the substance of an act, and the author of its pravity.
Thus the liberty of the will is made to consist not in the denial that its volitions are produced, but in the absence of impediments which might hinder its operations from taking effect.
The question is, not whether the will be a power which is often followed by necessitated effects; but whether there be a power behind the will by which its volitions are necessitated.
But that which in any respect makes way for a thing coming into being, or for any manner or circumstance of its first existence, must be prior to existence.
It is not possible for any mind, no matter how great its powers, to see the nature of things clearly when it comes to the contemplation of them with such a confusion of ideas.
We are merely conscious of the existence of the act itself, and not even of the power by means of which we act; the existence of the power is necessarily inferred from its exercise.
In like manner, the true theory of action is the key to the intellectual world, by which its difficulties are to be laid open and its enigmas solved.
It will not be denied, that if any being should bring sin to pass without any end at all, except to secure its existence, this would be a sinful agency.
Having sufficiently established his fundamental proposition in this sense, he proceeds to show that every effect and volition in particular, is necessarily connected with its cause.
If this want were supplied, then the philosophy of the mind might be, according to his view of its nature and operations, converted into a portion of mechanics.